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The reason for this Symposium is the upcoming tenth
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
1
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. In Daubert, the Supreme Court resolved the
2
division among the courts of appeals over the question whether the
general acceptance standard for the admission of expert opinion
3
testimony announced in Frye v. United States was applicable despite
4
the codification, in 1975, of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Court, of course, held that the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced
the Frye test. Interpreting Rule 702, the Court said that that Rule
“assign[s] to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s
testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
5
task at hand.”
It is appropriate to keep in mind, however, that there have been
other significant evidentiary milestones. On January 15, 1985, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided United States v.
6
Downing, an opinion by Judge Becker on which Justice Blackmun, in
7
Daubert, placed great reliance. And on December 5, 1983, the same
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DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990).
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293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.D.C. 1923).
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court of appeals, in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,
interpreted Rules 702 and 703 as usually favoring the admissibility of
expert opinion testimony.
I mention these rather old Third Circuit cases because they serve
as a good starting point for the discussion of an issue that, perhaps
reflecting my personal history, is of particular interest to me. That
issue is the respective roles of trial courts and appellate courts with
respect to the admissibility of evidence, and of expert opinion
evidence in particular.
In Japanese Electronic Products, the case came before the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals on an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants. Ordinarily, appellate courts
reviewing a summary judgment or a directed verdict exercise plenary
9
review. No deference is afforded to the trial court’s ruling. When,
however, the summary judgment or directed verdict occurs after a
trial court makes a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, the scope of appellate review becomes a bit more
complicated. Rule 103(a) is the first source of complication. It
addresses the scope of appellate review, providing, “Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected . . . .” This language suggests
a sort of “harmless error” approach to evidentiary rulings. A second
source of complication is Rule 104, dealing with trial court
determinations of preliminary questions concerning “the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege,
10
or the admissibility of evidence . . . .” A third source of complication
is the often-repeated statement in the case law that trial court
evidentiary rulings are ordinarily reviewed only for abuse of
11
discretion.
8

723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983) rev’d on other grounds, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1983).
9
See, e.g., Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693 (3d Cir. 1988); Equimark
Commercial Fin. Co. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 812 F.2d 141, 142 (3d Cir. 1987).
10
Rule 104 provides, in part, as follows:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally.
Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
11
See e.g., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979).

2003

TENTH ANNIVERSARY

129

No thoughtful jurist would, I suggest, urge that trial courts have
discretion to grant a summary judgment or a directed verdict, and
that appellate review of either should therefore be by the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Where, however, a claim or defense in
a civil case depends upon the admissibility of an expert’s opinion
testimony, it is quite possible for a trial court to put a finger on the
scale in making a preliminary evidentiary ruling. That can happen in
one of two ways: a ruling admitting the expert’s opinion and making
it possible for a case to go forward to trial and judgment, or a ruling
excluding the opinion and thereby terminating the case.
Before granting summary judgment in Japanese Electronic Products,
the district court excluded the expert opinions of several economists
that had been tendered in an offer of proof, as required by Rule
103(a)(2). That court recognized that it must make a Rule 104(a)
factual determination, and held that those opinions were excludable
under both Rule 702 and Rule 703. In ruling on the Rule 703
requirement of reliance on facts or data “of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject,” the district court refused to consider
the plaintiffs’ experts’ affidavits to the effect that the material they
relied upon was of a type relied upon by experts in their respective
12
fields. Similarly, in ruling that Rule 702 was not satisfied, the court
rejected the opinions because, among other reasons, they were not
13
“beyond the jury’s sphere of knowledge.”
Since the court of appeals was reviewing a summary judgment,
the panel was confronted with the question whether these in limine
evidentiary rulings should receive plenary review, or some more
deferential standard such as the clearly erroneous standard applied
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), or an abuse of discretion standard. The
opinion of the court said,
In substituting its own opinion as to what constitutes reasonable
reliance for that of the experts in the relevant fields the trial court
misinterpreted Rule 703.
The court’s approach involved
fundamental legal error because, as a matter of law, the district
court must make a factual inquiry and finding as to what data
experts in the field find reliable. There is no discretion to forbear
from making this inquiry and finding. Insofar as the district court
substituted its own views of reasonable reliance for those of the
14
experts, therefore, we review for legal error.

12
13
14

505 F. Supp at 1325-26.
Id. at 1333-34.
723 F.2d at 277.
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In other words, the court of appeals exercised plenary review of the
trial court’s decision to exclude under Rule 703. In this respect,
however, the opinion did not persuade Chief Judge Seitz, a panel
member whose views were expressed in a footnote:
Chief Judge Seitz agrees with the result reached by the majority,
but he believes that our review of the reliance determination
under Rule 703 is for abuse of discretion rather than for error of
law. In his view, improper application of the law is embraced
15
within the abuse of discretion standard. . . .

Since Chief Judge Seitz agreed that the district court’s Rule 703
ruling could not stand, it would appear that in his view, abuse of
discretion review permits rather vigorous scrutiny of a trial court’s
ruling to admit or exclude expert opinion testimony. That view is
confirmed elsewhere in the Japanese Electronic Products opinion, which
16
also rejects the district court’s reliance on Rule 702. That part of
the opinion of the court, with which Chief Judge Seitz did not
expressly disagree, says the following of the Rule 702 issue:
The court’s role [under Rule 702] is to make the determination
whether the proffered testimony “will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
Undoubtedly the court is clothed by Rule 702 with some degree
of discretion in determining whether the opinion will be helpful,
and we normally review only for abuse of discretion. Knight v. Otis
Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979). But that review must
be more discriminating if we believe that the court’s exercise of
discretion proceeded under a misapprehension as to the meaning
of the governing rules. The court’s misinterpretation of the
reasonable reliance requirement of Rule 703 is in this respect
17
significant.

The case of Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., which the court cited as
authority for the abuse of discretion standard of review, is one of
18
numerous cases making such a statement. It involved an appeal
from a directed verdict in a product defect case against an elevator
manufacturer. The trial court excluded the opinion evidence of an
engineer who was prepared to testify that unguarded elevator control
buttons were a design defect, because the engineer, while familiar
with other machinery control buttons, had never worked in the
elevator industry. While paying lip service to an abuse of discretion
standard of review, Judge Higginbotham in fact made what amounted
15
16
17
18

Id. at 277 n.43.
Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 278.
596 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979).
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to a de novo decision that the expert’s inexperience in the design and
manufacture of elevators should go to the weight, and not the
19
admissibility, of his opinion.
The trial court in Knight had no
discretion to exclude an opinion that would have been sufficient to
prevent a directed verdict, just as the trial court in Japanese Electronic
Products had no discretion to exclude expert opinions that might be
20
The difference between
sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
abuse of discretion review and plenary review in these cases is
imperceptible, as it should be.
By way of contrast, United States v. Downing arose in a different
appellate setting: an appeal of a criminal conviction after a verdict
against the defendant. The government’s case depended heavily
upon contested eyewitness identification. Defense counsel tendered
the testimony of a psychologist who would testify to the unreliability
of eyewitness identification testimony. The trial court excluded the
evidence on the authority of Rule 702. The court of appeals reversed
the defendant’s conviction and conditionally ordered a new trial.
Judge Becker wrote,
Judicial resistance to the introduction of this kind of expert
testimony is understandable given its innovativeness and the fear
of trial delay spawned by the spectre of the creation of a cottage
industry of forensic psychologists. The logic of Fed. R. Evid. 702
is inexorable, however, and requires, as the [United States v.]
Smith, [State v.] Chapple and [People v.] McDonald courts
recognized, that expert testimony on eyewitness perception and
memory be admitted at least in some circumstances. We
therefore conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law
when it in effect decided that expert testimony on the subject is
21
simply not admissible.

“Erred as a matter of law” means, of course, plenary review, at least
where a trial court categorically rules out a class or category of expert
opinion testimony as unhelpful to the jury. But Judge Becker also
recognized that since a new trial might occur, the trial court would
still have to decide whether to admit the specific evidence proffered
22
by the defendant.
Thus, the balance of the Downing opinion
19

Id. at 88.
The Supreme Court in Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986), did not address the admissibility of the expert opinion evidence.
Instead, in the first of the trilogy of summary judgment opinions that enlarged the
power of courts to grant summary judgment, it reversed the court of appeals decision
that there was sufficient evidence of a predatory pricing conspiracy to go to the jury.
See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
21
753 F.2d at 1232 (footnote omitted).
22
Id.
20
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explains how Rule 702 should be applied, an exposition which Justice
Blackmun found so persuasive in Daubert. Judge Becker recognized
that the trial court had never made the “fit” determination required
23
by Rule 702, or the relevance determination required by Rule 403.
But having ruled that categorical exclusions were legal errors, he
went on to say, “The district court’s error will become harmless if on
remand the district court, in the exercise of its Rule 702 or 403
24
discretion, decides that the proffered testimony is not admissible.”
Only if the trial court concluded, after an evidentiary hearing
concerning the proffered expert opinion testimony, that the
25
testimony was admissible was a new trial required. But a judgment
26
reinstating the verdict would be subject to further appellate review.
A study of Downing for enlightenment on the scope of review of
trial court rulings admitting or excluding expert opinion evidence
leaves one with the distinct impression that scope of review is a truly
complex problem. Written by a brilliant and extremely careful jurist,
the opinion recognizes that some rulings, even in criminal cases, will
be subjected to plenary review for legal error, while others will be
subjected only to abuse of discretion or harmless error scrutiny.
Downing was written in the context in which there is probably the
greatest institutional interest or pressure to defer to rulings by a court
of first instance: an appeal after a jury trial in a criminal case. Yet
even in that context, the court recognized the necessity for avoiding a
rule of undue deference.
Perhaps because Judge Becker’s Downing opinion sent somewhat
mixed signals on the respective roles of trial and appellate courts in
the admission of expert opinion testimony, Justice Blackmun in
Daubert did not address that subject. Shortly after Daubert was handed
down, however, Judge Becker had another occasion to deal with
expert opinion testimony. The occasion was presented by a trial
court’s second grant of summary judgment in a massive lawsuit
27
growing out of the use of PCB in a rail yard in Paoli, Pennsylvania.
In a lengthy opinion dealing with expert witness efforts to link
exposure to PCB with the plaintiffs’ illnesses, the court discussed
28
“Standard of Review” extensively. That part of the opinion is worth

23

Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
25
Id. at 1244.
26
Id. at 1244 n.28.
27
The first summary judgment was reversed in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (Paoli I), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
28
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 749-50 (3d Cir. 1994).
24
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quoting at some length, because it confirms what had by this time
become obvious. The scope of review of Rule 702 and Rule 703
rulings by trial courts is not a simple matter. Judge Becker wrote,
A district court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion, “but to the extent the district court’s
ruling turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence
our review is plenary.” DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 944. The threshold
rule is, of course, one of deference. However:
the justifications for committing decisions to the
discretion of the court are not uniform, and may vary
with the specific type of decisions. Although the
standard of review in such instances is generally framed
as “abuse of discretion,” in fact the scope of review will
be directly related to the reason why that category or
type of decision is committed to the trial court’s
discretion in the first instance.
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir.1981). In several
other areas, we have applied a heightened abuse of discretion
review. . . .
While evidentiary rulings are generally subject to a particularly
high level of deference because the trial court has a superior
vantage point to assess the evidence, see Criden, 648 F.2d at 818,
evaluating the reliability of scientific methodologies and data does
not generally involve assessing the truthfulness of the expert
witnesses and thus is often not significantly more difficult on a
cold record. Moreover, here there are factors that counsel in
favor of a hard look at (more stringent review of) the district
court’s exercise of discretion. For example, because the reliability
standard of Rules 702 and 703 is somewhat amorphous, there is a
significant risk that district judges will set the threshold too high
and will in fact force plaintiffs to prove their case twice. Reducing
this risk is particularly important because the Federal Rules of
Evidence display a preference for admissibility. See Daubert, ___
U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2794.
. . . Moreover, the likelihood of finding an abuse of discretion is
affected by the importance of the district court’s decision to the
outcome of the case and the effect it will have on important
rights. See Marroquin-Manriquez v. Immigration and Natur. Serv., 699
F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.1983) (abuse of discretion will only be
found in discovery if there has been interference with a
substantial right or fundamental unfairness at the trial has
resulted.); cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893,
902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (the procedural safeguards required by
due process increase as the importance of the decision being
made increases).

134

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:127

We acknowledge that there is arguably a tension between the
substantial deference normally accorded to rulings where the trial
court has a superior vantage point and the preference for
admissibility of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We resolve any
such tension by holding that when the district court’s
exclusionary evidentiary rulings with respect to scientific opinion
testimony will result in a summary or directed judgment, we will
give them a “hard look” (more stringent review, cf. Brody v. Spang,
957 F.2d at 1115) to determine if a district court has abused its
29
discretion in excluding evidence as unreliable.

The point Judge Becker makes is that categorizing an issue as
reviewable for abuse of discretion is the beginning, not the end, of
the appellate inquiry. In matters as complex as the performance of
the gatekeeping functions imposed by Rules 702 and 703, as
interpreted in Daubert and Downey, the term abuse of discretion is not
particularly useful unless it is given content and context. And surely
when a trial court’s exclusionary rulings on expert opinion testimony
result in a summary judgment or a directed verdict, Judge Becker is
right in insisting that the appellate tribunal should give them a “hard
look.” Otherwise, as noted above, a trial court could put its finger on
the scale and thereby frustrate the exercise of plenary review of such
summary judgments or directed verdicts by appellate tribunals.
Indeed, a reasonable case can be made that the evidentiary
ruling, as part of the record on summary judgment or directed
verdict, should be subjected to the same plenary review as is applied
to the rest of the record. This is my own view. It is not, I hasten to
point out, the view of the United States Supreme Court.
Not long after the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed
Judge Becker’s remarkable exegesis on the proper interpretation of
Rules 702 and 703 in Paoli II, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit was presented with a case in the same factual and procedural
30
posture.
As in Paoli II, the trial court had granted summary
judgment after excluding the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on the
31
A divided court of appeals
link between PCB and his cancer.
32
reversed. Writing for the majority, Judge Barket addressed scope of
review as follows:
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Fane v.
Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir.1991), aff’d, 507 U.S. 761,

29
30
31
32

Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
Joiner, 78 F.3d at 528.
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113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993). Summary judgment is
appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 2553-54, 191 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory
Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1463 (11th
Cir.1994). Because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing
expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a
particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge’s
exclusion of expert testimony. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, ____, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d
717, 750 (3d Cir.1994). To the extent that the district court’s
ruling turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence,
33
our review is plenary.

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit majority endorsed the Paoli II approach to
scope of review in the exclusion of evidence/summary judgment
context. The dissenting judge, although disagreeing with the
majority’s analysis of the opinion, also endorsed the Paoli II “hard
34
look” approach. Indeed, the dissenting opinion of Senior Judge
Smith went further than the majority in pointing out the complexity
35
of the issues presented by an exclusionary ruling.
The Supreme Court, of course, granted certiorari in the
36
Eleventh Circuit case and reversed in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.
Although three Justices wrote opinions in Joiner, the entire Court
agreed that the court of appeals erred in applying an overly stringent
33
34
35

Id.

36

Id. at 529 (some citations omitted).
Id. at 535.
The dissenting judge wrote:
Because understanding the scope of appellate review helps define the
role of the trial court, I believe we should follow other circuits and
present a more precise explanation of the standard of review. See, e.g.,
Cook v. American Steamship Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1995) (Three
standards in reviewing admissibility of expert opinion: (1) trial court’s
factfinding is reviewed for clear error; (2) trial court’s ruling whether
opinion is scientific knowledge is question of law requiring plenary
review; and (3) trial court’s ruling whether opinion assists the trier of
fact is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434,
436-37 (7th Cir.1995) (Plenary review of whether trial court applied
Daubert framework, but trial court’s findings not disturbed unless
manifestly erroneous.).
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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review of the trial court’s ruling to exclude Rule 702 opinion
evidence. The standard of review of all evidentiary rulings, according
to the Court, is pure, simple, unvarnished abuse of discretion.
Moreover, said Chief Justice Rehnquist,
We likewise reject respondent’s argument that because the
granting of summary judgment in this case was “outcome
determinative,” it should have been subjected to a more searching
standard of review. On a motion for summary judgment,
disputed issues of fact are resolved against the moving party—
here, petitioners. But the question of admissibility of expert
testimony is not such an issue of fact, and is reviewable under the
37
abuse of discretion standard.

There are several remarkable features of the Joiner opinion that
give one pause. The first is the authorities on which it relies for the
proposition that all evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for abuse of
38
discretion. The Court cited four cases, all involving rulings made
during the course of a trial. Only one of the four, Spring Co. v. Edgar,
involved the admission of expert opinion evidence, and the denial of
what would today be called a motion for a directed verdict. Spring Co.
v. Edgar does refer to district court discretion to admit or exclude
39
evidence, although it was decided almost a century before Congress
codified the Federal Rules of Evidence. By contrast, the Joiner
discussion of scope of review does not even mention that admissibility
of Rule 702 evidence may involve an interpretation of the Rule.
Although the other three cases cited in Joiner were decided after
the codification of the Rules, none involved Rule 702. Old Chief
concerned a Rule 403 relevancy ruling in which the majority found
an abuse of discretion in admitting a criminal record rather than
accepting defendant’s stipulation as to an element of the offense.
Abel involved the question whether Rules 608 and 610 should be
construed to limit cross-examination of a fact witness for bias. The
Supreme Court held that control of the scope of such cross40
examination is governed by Rules 401 and 403.
Rainey did
peripherally touch on opinions, but not Rule 702 opinions. The
Court held that a report of investigation, offered as an exception to
the hearsay rule on the authority of Federal Rules of Evidence
803(8)(c), was not excludable because it contained an opinion. Rule
37

Id. at 142-43.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 (1997); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); Spring Co.
v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1879).
39
99 U.S. 645, 658 (1879).
40
469 U.S. at 54.
38
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803(8)(c)’s qualification “unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness” was the statute’s own
41
safeguard against the admission of unreliable evidence. Moreover,
in Rainey, Justice Brennan’s opinion on the Rule 803(8)(c) question
is quite clearly an example of plenary review of what he identifies as
an issue of statutory interpretation. And in making the door-opening
interpretation of Rule 803(8)(c), Justice Brennan referred to “the
Federal Rules’ general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers
42
to ‘opinion’ testimony.”
The Court’s discussion of abuse of
discretion review in Rainey refers to the trial court’s restriction of the
43
scope of cross-examination, not to its Rule 803(8)(c) ruling.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s Joiner opinion is remarkable for a
citation it did not include. There is no reference to Judge Becker’s
exegesis of Rule 702 in Paoli II, although in Joiner, the Eleventh
Circuit relied upon it.
At this point, one may effectively compare what the Supreme
Court did in Joiner with what it did in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
44
Zenith Radio. That case was one of the summary judgment trilogy
that proclaimed a change in the role of federal courts in passing
45
upon motions for summary judgment. Instead of discussing the
Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial judge’s ruling excluding expert
opinion testimony of economists, the Supreme Court focused, as
Professors Friedman, Mueller, and other participants in this
Symposium suggest courts should, on sufficiency rather than
admissibility. Exercising plenary review, the Supreme Court held that
the entire record, including the expert opinion testimony, was legally
insufficient to permit a federal antitrust claim to go to the jury.
The Supreme Court’s vote was five to four. Furthermore, since
the court of appeals’ reversal of summary judgment was unanimous,
seven of the ten Article III judges who looked at the summary
judgment record voted for the question of sufficiency of evidence to
go to the jury. That head count is, however, totally irrelevant. In a
hierarchal appellate structure, it is the Supreme Court that has the
ultimate responsibility for the meaning of federal statutes. In fact,
the majority expressed no deference to the trial court or
intermediate court rulings. Rather, it quite properly exercised
41

488 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 169.
43
Id. at 175.
44
475 U.S. 574 (1983).
45
The other two in the trilogy were Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
42
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plenary review in deciding the legal question of what evidence is
legally sufficient to go to the jury on a federal antitrust claim. On
that legal question, the Justices did not agree.
The summary judgment trilogy was, I suggest, basically sound.
The cases are sometimes described as relaxing the standards for
granting summary judgment. A more accurate description, I think, is
that the summary judgment trilogy admonished federal judges, and
especially appellate judges, to take more seriously their obligation to
make careful decisions on the legal question, or perhaps the mixed
46
question of law and fact, of what quantity and quality of proof
suffices to take a question to the jury. Certainly, on federal law
questions, the Court must be right about plenary review of the
sufficiency of evidence.
But there is a countervailing consideration. The hardest cases
for appellate tribunals are those over which they exercise plenary
review. The judges in such cases do not enjoy the luxury of rules of
deference to the original tribunal. Matsushita is a paradigm example.
The summary judgment record was in an appendix of more than
twenty volumes, occupying over eight feet of shelf space. In order to
exercise plenary review over the legal question of sufficiency, the
judges of the court of appeals and the Justices of the Supreme Court
were obliged to, and I am sure did, familiarize themselves with that
enormous quantity of material. That time-consuming task necessarily
competed with other cases. Trial courts mostly have the advantage of
working on one case at a time. But because of the pyramidal
structure of courts, as a case is appealed and goes higher in that
structure, the judicial time available for any one case contracts
significantly. Thus, there are institutional pressures favoring rules on
scope of review that permit greater deference toward initial decision
makers.
In cases such as Matsushita presenting important federal law
issues, the federal appellate courts ought to resist that institutional
pressure. In cases in which the rule of law involved is a state law rule,
the duty of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals is, perhaps,
less certain. Unless Congress decides to exercise Commerce Clause
authority over tort law reform, final responsibility for defining the
standards of sufficiency in, for example, mass tort cases will remain
with the highest state courts. That distinction may tend to justify
both what the Court did in Matsushita and what it did not do in Joiner.
It may also arguably tend to justify the Supreme Court’s rejection in
46

Cf. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (holding that voluntariness of a
confession is a mixed question of law and fact requiring plenary review).
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Joiner of heightened scrutiny of Daubert rulings that result in summary
judgments or directed verdicts in mass tort cases.
Maybe. I am not, however, persuaded by this argument, which I
made up, because while mass tort cases mostly do not present federal
substantive law sufficiency questions, they do involve other federal
interests. That is so because those cases involve other very important
federal law questions. In 1975, when Congress enacted the Federal
Rules of Evidence, except for questions of privilege, it chose to
federalize the entire law of evidence applied in the federal trial
courts, both in federal substantive law cases, and in state substantive
47
law cases. A policy judgment by the Supreme Court that it would
leave enforcement of that essentially procedural federal law to the
courts of appeals, because more significant federal law issues like
antitrust and the Fourteenth Amendment demanded its attention,
would, as a matter of self-defense, be understandable. A policy
judgment that it would require the more numerous judges of the
courts of appeals to defer to the discretion of the trial courts, leaving
the federal law of evidence in an abuse of discretion limbo, is not.
So, what the Supreme Court did in Joiner does not seem very
defensible. What, then, do brief writers and courts of appeals judges
do about a case that seems so wrong? That is not an easy question.
The review system would become anarchic if judges lower down in
the system failed to acknowledge the superior authority, if not the
superior wisdom, of those who by the vagaries of the political
appointive system are above them. Due respect must be paid. But
due respect does not mean reading into a bad opinion all that it might
mean, and not looking for ambiguities that leave room for
interpretation. One can pick out sentences in Joiner that can be
interpreted as requiring almost total deference to all trial court
evidentiary rulings. On the other hand, one can find ambiguity in
Joiner in the absence of a nuanced definition of abuse of discretion, a
definition including legal error, procedural irregularity, disregard of
evidence that should have been considered, and clearly erroneous
factual determinations. Any one of these ought to lead to a statement
that there was an abuse of discretion.
Ultimately, Rule 702 and Rule 703 require the determination of
what, in many if not most cases, will be a mixed question of law and
fact. The scope of review of such determinations should be at least as
plenary as is required for summary judgments by Matsushita, Liberty
Lobby, and Celotex. Such an approach by the courts of appeals would
47
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not be anarchic, and might even persuade a majority of the Justices
that Joiner should at least be restated.

